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No Viet Request for GIs Found The Senator on Sept.

By Murrey Marder Weshington Post Staff Writer

The Nixon Administration has searched the records in vain for evidence that South Vietnam made any formal request for U.S. combat troops before the first American battalions reached there in March, 1965, officials acknowledged yesterday.

officials Administration amining, and mulling over, the reason to the delay in South Vietnamese request for answer an inquiry from Sen. J. William Fulbright constant of the second o

U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

cific document" and there was mized its absence, however, on rass the U.S. position. grounds that the record shows consultation"

(D-Ark.) about that surprising eign Relations Committee, was omission from the record of because "a lot of historical research" was required, the gressional Record, where it ca-"We could not find a spe-State Department said. Other caped general notice, although sources said that during this Fulbright said at the time: quest," for the troops, a State period the administration ago-Department official acknowl-nized over how to make a that Congress was not asked

Fulbright eventually received a circuitous reply, about sending the U.S. troops which avoided saying flatly that "amounts to a request." that there never was a formal

"It is shocking to realise edged yesterday. He mini-reply that would not embar- for specific authority for the sending of American soldiers to South Vietnam and, landed, that the government of Bouts Vietnam itself did not ment these troops."

See TROOPS, A22, Col. 4

Fulbright said yesterday the the incident is another example of the Executive Branch's failure "to deal candidly with the Congress and the public" on Vietnam during the Johnson administration.

On May 12, Fulbright wrote to Secretary of State William P. Rogers, noting that is April, Gen. William C. West. moreland, in a 347-page report on his years as U.S. com-mander in South Vietnas, said it was his "judgmess" that U.S. forces should be ployed in Vietnam.

Fulbright noted that Westmoreland report failmention any "formal refine the South Vietna government for U.S. intervention with combat troops. asked Rogers to supply con of "any such request . .

The long-delayed reply dated Sept. 2, 1969, and si by H. G. Torbert Jr., acting sistant secretary for const sional relations, but it represented a studied admini tration response. Its key sen tences were:

clear, the initial deploy United States combat troops in Social Vietnam in the spring and summer of 1965 resulted from a continuing analysis of a constantly changing situation, a major factor in which was the deployment to South Vietnam of regular North Vietname troops from the end of 1964 onward ...

"The continuing analysis to which I have referred, and series of decisions resulting from it, were made in ele and constant consultation with the government of Vietnam.

The process of analyzing the situation by the two goveraments, and the consultation and agreement therees were such as to be regarded by our government as constituting a request from the ernment of Vietnam."

The reply letter then asserts that "this request was con-firmed by the communique" issued by South Vietnam's Prime Minister "on March 7 concerning the arrivel of talions in South Vietnam-the United States combat forces."

government of asked for and ob tained the agreement of the American government" to send in the two Marine batteliens.

But that Saigon langue March 7, 1965, the shows, only coincided w United States Defense D ment's public annous of March 6 that the Marine force was already on its way to South at that time